I'm a second year graduate student in the Linguistics department at the University of Maryland, College Park where I'm also part of the Language Science Center. Broadly, I'm interested in meaning, its acquisition, and the relationship between linguistic and conceptual structure. Currently, I'm using tools from formal semantics, psycholinguistics, and psychophysics to look into the lexical specifications and acquisition of quantifiers, as well as how they interface with extralinguistic cognition. I'm advised by Jeff Lidz and Paul Pietroski.
First- vs. Second-order Quantifiers: Proportional quantifiers like most require second-order logic, but others -- like each, every, and all -- are expressible using the tools of first-order logic. So, how are they in fact represented in speakers' minds? With Jeff Lidz, Paul Pietroski, and Justin Halberda, I'm developing a set of experimental diagnostics that try to answer this question by looking at default verification procedures and memory for visual scenes. The idea is that, all else (task, participant, truth-conditions, etc.) equal, preferences for individual-based or set-based strategies reflect underlying first- and second-order representational formats, respectively. For example, we find the same participant will use an individual-based strategy to evaluate an each-statement but switch to a set-based strategy when evaluating an every- or all-statement.
More & Most: Relatedly, we've been looking at how the comparative more and the proportional most bias different visual search and memory encoding strategies in adults and kids. One upshot is that When evaluating more-statements (like "more of the dots are blue"), people attend to and represent the focused (blue) and non-focused (non-blue) sets. When evaluating most-statements on the other hand (like "most of the dots are blue"), people attend to and represent the focused set (blue dots) and the superset (dots). In displays with only two colors, this is a sub-optimal strategy (as it introduces more noise into the number estimates than a simple direct comparision). We even see consequences of these strategies for how well participants remember seemingly incidental information, like the sets' center of mass.
Event Concepts & Verb Learning: I'm working with Alexander Williams, Jeff Lidz, and Laurel Perkins to identify events -- like x taking y from z -- that infants view under a 3-participant concept but that adults often describe with transitive sentences like "The girl took the truck". The ultimate goal is to better understand how learners relate the arguments in a given clause to the participants in the event it describes. And eventually, to give an account of how they use this information to acquire verb meanings.
Pre-UMD: Before coming to Maryland I studied Cognitive Science at Johns Hopkins. I was fortunate enough to work with Justin Halberda on a number of projects, some of which were related to the Approximate Number System and its interface with language. I also had the opportunity to work with Akira Omaki on a project investigating the relationship between working memory and parsing.